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lfo. T0-5061 - Klrb7 v. nltnoia 
,--• -·•- "' '"' •- ""• V1.4.•"V .._ J V 
Mr . Jn~.~tice Black 
Mr. Ju::>t:i.c0 Dou.r,lns 
Mr • .TP~ '\ 5.cG J::.trlan 
Mr. J~3~ i~8 Drcn~on 
Mr . Ju~tlco Sto~nrt 
Mr • .Ti!. :~ ~-.:cu !,:arsh::tll 
.Mr . J , · s t i c,3 Bla c:l<.lllt.L"l 
F:vo.m: Vll1i to, J. 
Mr. Justice mute, concurring in thO r•e~l-t'!fJ ~.·L Gd ~----­
United State& v. WDde• 388 u.s. 218 (1967) 1 and 
Gilbert "~• C~l1torn1a., 388 u.s. 2€L (1967), govern tbte 
caae end c :)m;;ol reversal ot the judgment ot the Ill1noia 
Supreme cou1~t. ':he State requests that we reeons14er and 
overrul$ Wado and Gilbert. I em not at tb1B time persuaded 
that those cases abould be overruled, and I would prefer 
not to consider taktng tbo.t step without rear~t to a 
.tull court. 
. 










CHAM BER S O F" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRE N NAN. JR. 
Dear Chief: 
~u:pnmt <q4lu.rt 4lf tqe 'Jllnittb ~tattG 
Jfagqmgt4ltt. ~. <q. 2!lgiJ!.j 
Jamnry 17, 1.972 
I have your memorandum suggestjng reargument in No. 70-5061, 
Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-26, Gooding v. Wilson and No. 70-45, 
United States v. Brewster. 
You indicate that you thought the votes in each of these cases was 
4 to 3. My record shows that Gooding v. Wilson was 5 to 2 to affirm. 
The votes to affirm were Thurgood, .Byron, Potter, Bill Douglas and 
I. The votes to reverse were yours and Harry's. I've circulated a 
proposed opinion for the Court on that premise. 
My records do show that the votes in Kirby and Brewster were 
both 4 to 3. In Kirby I've circulated an opinion which Bill Douglas 
and Thurgood have joined. Byron has filed a separate opinion con-
curring in the judgment. 
In Brewster, my record indicates that Potter, Thurgood and 
Harry have joined your opinion and Bill Douglas has joined my 
dissent. Byron also voted to affirm. 
You'll remember that my view on reargument of 4 to 3 cases is 
that this is a matter for conference discussion. Certainly, as in the 
case of S & E Contractors, if at least four of seven vote reargument 
then there should be reargument. I would suppose someone would 
have to make the motion and then a vote be taken as we did Friday 
in S & E Contractors. In any event, I see no reason for rearguing 
Gooding v. Wilson if the five who voted to affirm remain of that 
view and join my proposed opinion. 
6 '. . ' / ' ~(;-,_ '- .• 
W. J. B. Jr. 
cc: The Conference 
~u.prnnt ~ ourt of tlt t 'Pttitc ~ ~~tntes 
'Jllaalrngtlltt, p. <!;. 2n?n.s 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS January 17, 1972 
Dear Chief: 
I vote against putting down 
for reargument the following cases: 
No. 70-26 
Uo. 70-45 
- Gooding v. Wilson 
- U. S. v. Brewster 
• 
No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
. \ 
~ \.;V 
' · i. _. 
William 0. Douglas 
CHAMBERS 01" 
j}ntrrmu ~..rud 1li tq.t ~nitt{t j>tattg 
2.fnsfri:ttgimt, ~. ~· 2llbi~~ 
January 17, 1972 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
We have now set two cases for reargwnent and 
there are others that seem to me should be similarly 
treated. 
ment. 
The following are my "nominations" for reargu-
No. 70-5061 --Kirby v. Illinois 
No. 70-26 --Gooding v. Wilson 
No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster 
I previously indicated my willingness to haveS. & E. 
Contractors v. U.S., and Lego v. Twomey reargued. The 
former is now scheduled for reargwnent and the latter has come 
down. There may be others, and generally I will vote to re-
argue any 4-3 case unless it is a ''JMH pewee." 
To facilitate filing problems, I am sending individual 





;§ttJrrtttU Qfourl cf tqt 'J!lttitth .ihttts 
~as£ringtctt. ~. Qf. 2llfi'!.;l 
-JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 18, 1972 
Dear Chief: 
This is in response to your memorandum of 
January 17 concerning reargum.ents. 
I norninate for reargument the two abortion 
cases, No. 70-18, Roe v. WadE~, and No. 70-40, Doe 
v. Bolton. It seems to me that the importance of the 
issues is such. that the cases merit full bench treatment. 
I think another candidate is No. 70-58, Fein v. 
Selective Service System. 
So far as your nominations are concerned, my 
reaction is that No. 70-45, United States v. Brewster, 
because of its fundamental importance and precedent, 
deserves reargument, and that No. 70-5061, Kirby v. 
Illinois, should also be reconsidered. Justice White• s 
separate concurrence certainly so indicates. 
In S\unmary, I vote to set down for reargument 
Nos. 70-18 a:nd 70-40, No. 70-45 and No. 70-5061. I 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.. 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ... · .............. .. , 19 . . . No. 70-5061 





Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J ................... . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
vs. 
ILLINOIS 
CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
~~----~--~SrT_AT_E~M __ EN~T--~--,---+---r--4SENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D lNG 
Conf. 2/18/72 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . . . : .............. , 19 .. . 
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Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
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Kirby v. Illinois 
Cert to Illinois SC 
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4--,t....~A, ~ ~ 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED a ,( 4-v: &wt4.C.M 
(1) Does the Wade-Gilbert rule that pretrial line-ups 
are critical stages of the prosecution at which the accused is 
entitled to counsel apply to pre-indictment line-ups? 
(2) If so, should Wade and Gilbert be overruled? 
FACTS 
Petr and another man were charged with the day-light 
robbery of a man walking along the street in Chicago. Two 
days after the robberyp police officers stopped the two men 
and questioned them about an unrelated offense. Upon examinin~ 
their identification, the officers noticed that each possessed 
papers indicating that he was Willie Shard, the robbery victim. 
Although the police were unaware of the robbery 1they thought it 
CONTROLLING CASESa United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 217 (1967); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
I 
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suspicious that each would possess the sa- me ID. Upon ques~ 
""' 
tioning, the police officers decided that the two should be 
taken downtown. In the meantime, Shard had reported the robbery 
and the arresting officers checked the police records and 
discovered that a Willie Shard had been victimized. They --called Shard and told him that they had picked up two suspects -and asked him to come to the station to identify them. A 
police officer was sent to Shard's residence to pick him up 
and bring him to the station. Shard was brought into a squad 
room where the two defendants and two police officers were --seated. Shard immediately stated that the two were the men 
who had robbed him. -
Petr was tried by a jury and found guilty of the robbery 
for which he received a 5 to 12-year sentence. His conviction 
was aff'd on appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
(1) Question # 1 
The Illinois SC held that Petr's 14th Amendment right to 
due process (right to counsel) had not been violated by the 
show-up after arrest in the absence of counsel. The State 
ct read Wade and Gilbert as requiring counsel only at post" 
indictment line-ups. This is the minority view, accepted by 
5 states and no federal courts. The majority viewp that 
ha.~ 
the rationale of Wade applies ll~h equal applicability to 
pr~and post-indictment showings, is accepted by 12 states 
and 7 of the Circuits. 
+4.'-s 
When ~ case was argued originally, there were three 
opinions issued. Justice Brennan, joined by JusticesDouglas 









limitation to post~indictment line• ups. Justice White 
stated that Wade and Gilbert govern the instant case 
and that the only real question is whether those cases sh~uld 
be overruled. That he is unwilling to do without reargument 
by the full Court. Justice Stewart, joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justice Blackmun, dissented on the ground that 
Wade and Gilbert applied only to cases in which the show-up 
occurred after the defendant was indicted. The judgment of 
the Court, then, prior to this reargument was 4-3) with Justice 
White apparently willing to reconsider after hearing argument 
anew. Therefore, it is apparent that you and Justice Rehn-
quits are likely to cast the "swing" votes in this case. 
The first question, whether Wade-Gilbert applies only 
to post-indictment lineups, is, for me, a rather easy ques-
tiori. There is language at two pm~nts in the Opinion for the 
Court (Brennan, J.) in which he states the holding to be that 
"there can be little d~ubt that for Wade the :east-indictment 
lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution ••• " Id. at 
237. Also, when stating the question, Brennan states that 
it is "whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial 
are tb be excluded from evidence because the accused was ex-
hibited to the witnesses before trial at a post-indictment 
lineup • • " Id. at 219. The only other grain of text 
indicating that Wade could b~roperly limited to its facts - " 
is the brief discussion concerning the absence of "counter-
vailing policy considerations against the requirement of the 
presence of counsel.'' Id. at 237. On this score the Court 
points out that prompt identifications will not be 
forestalled since attorneys for Wade and Gilbert had already 
,. 
, .
- .. 4-.., 
been appointed and were available. The Court goes on, how-
ever, to point out that "we leave open the question whether 
ddiilidiiidd the presence of substitute counsel might suffice 
where notification and presence of the suspect's own counsel 
would result in prejudicial delay." Id. Finally, it may be 
noted that in the facts of each case the defendants were both 
already under indictment. This is the extent of the textual 
support for the proposition that Wade-Gjlbert may be read 
restrictively. 
The evidence on the other side is overpowering. The 
thesis of the Wade and Gilbert opinions is that the right -to counsel guaranteed by the 6th Amendment, through the 14th, - It . l " extends outside the courtroom and into the pretrLa area -to those points in the criminal process where "critical con-
occur and "where 
the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce 
the trial itself to a mere formality." Id. at 224. At 
other points the Court makes clear that the right to counsel 
contemplates the right to "meaningfully cross-examine" 
witnesses against him. Id. at 223-24. The Court also 
states, 
"the accused is guaranteed that he need not s!5and 
alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a 
fair trial." ID. at 226. 
Without belaboring the point further, I think a fair reading 
of the Brennan opinion undercuts pretty thoroughly the 
notion that its principle applies in cases of post-mndict-
ment confrontations only. 
., 
".t; •• 
t , . 
... 
... s .... -
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Secondly, the other opinions concurring in the tudgment 
that the right to counsel applies at the lineup stage (Clark, 
Black, Fortas) each agree separately that the right exists 
but none of those opinions even intimates that the ruling 
is restricted to post-indictment lineups. Clark's short 
opinion would seem, most clearly of the three, to contem-
plate application of the rule to pre-indictment lineups. 
His thesis is that when Miranda held that an accused had 
a right to an attorney at a "custodial interrogation" he 
surely had the same right for all lineups. 
Thirdly, the dissenting Justices make a point of pointing 
out the breadth of the majorityvs opiniona 
"The rule applies to all lineups • • • regardless 
of when the identification occurs, in time or place, 
and whether before or after indictment or information." 
Id. at 251. 
The majority chose not to counter this assertion in the dissent 
although Justice Brennan did feel compelled to respond to 
other broad assertions in the same paragraph of the dissent. 
See, footnote 33, Pp 241-42. in which the majority counters 
the contention that the rule applies regardless of the eire 
cumstances of the case. 
If this case were merely one of parsing the language of 
Wade and Gilbert to determine what its scope is, I think this 
case would present no problems. If one goes beyond the terms 
inions and asks whether there is any rational 
- rawing a line at the indictment s·1l:age, I still think 
the problem is not a difficult one. If counsel serves a 
valuable function at any lineup, he serves that same purpose 
whether the accused has been indicted or not. I think this 
--6--
is the teaching of Escobedo and Miranda. The former recog~ 
nized a right to counsel at a stage in which the investi-
gation has "focused" on the accused. Miranda, in footnote 
4 of the majority opinion, says that "focusing" has occurred 
whenever the accused is interrogated while in custody, i.e., -
cusodial interrogation. 
Illinois argues that the show~ in this case was purely 
investigatory and that the case had not yet sufficiently 
focused on the defendants to constitute an accusatory stage 
of the case. That argument has little force on this record. 
The police had in custody two men who had in their possession 
articles of identification and travelers checks with the name 
of the victim on them. The victim has recently reported being 
robbed by two men. The police immediately called Shard and 
asked him to come to the station. There was little room for 
doubt that the police thought they had the perpetrators of 
the robbery. Even if they were not sure, it is almost uncon- ) 
trovertable that they had significantly focused on the accused. 
The impotance of the sho~ on these facts cannot be under-
estimated. The identification of the two my the victim was 
predictably the key element in the c~~ Petr and his friend 
had attempted to explain that they stumbled aiCross the 
'" an 
IDs in j. alley. A positive identification would seal their 
fate, a negative investigation might have lead to their 
release. 
There is the argument, on the other side, that a re-
quirement of counsel at this stage will unnecessarily delay 
investigations and will impose an administrative burden on 
the states. A burden there is. But it is no more cumbersome 
- ... 7--
than the burden imposed by Miranda. The state must provide 
the accused with the opportunity to state whether he wishes t 
have counsel at the lineup. If he so desires, a lineup must 
be postponed until counsel is available. The procedure would 
be precisely the same, and the interference with the investi-
gative process no more difficult, as the case of an in-cus-
tody interrogation. Of course, exceptions might still be 
allowed for exigent circumstances, such as on-the-scene 
show-ups. Several courts ha~ held since Wade was decided 
that in the exigent circumstance in which a suspect is appre-
hended shortly after a crime, the police would be justified 
/ 
in taking the arrestee back to the scene of the crime and 1 
~ u.~. "· Ruqe.l~ .,or F'.?rN llf/0 , 
showing him to the victim or other eyewitnesses. This is 
1\ 
justified by the dual interests in obtaining a quick affirmatiion 
that they have the r~t man so the investigation may cease 
(or continue, depending on the result of the showing}. Also 
the witness's memory is likely to be freshest immediately 
after the incidentJ details which fade with time may still be 
fresh several minutes or hours after the commission of a 
crime. While those interests of the law enforcement personnel 
may justify a counsel-less showup under exigent circumstances, 
they do not justify the broadscale use of counsel-less lineups 
prior to indictment. 
One final note. The California amicus brief states, at 
page l2g that "the innocent suspect in particular has a 
common, nonadversary interest with the policer the expeditious 
conduct of an identification procedure which may bring about 
his release from custody." Since it is the prospect of mis-
identification which is the wellspring for all of the Court 0 s 




the potential victim of a misidentification would sensibly 
prefer to have an immediate counsel-less show-up. I think 
that if I were arrested because I matched the description 
someone had given of a robber or other criminal, I would 
most certainly want the aid of an attorney in a hurry. 
Once I am identified--mistakenly--in a lineup I may never 
be able to undo that damage. The California statement 
is the product of the basic assumption,shared by many who 
look upon constitutional-prmeedural protections as nothing 
but impediments to law enforcement designed to cuddle and ' 
coddle, that the innocent have nothing to fear fr~ the 
To +-J. e. ~l1-o .. "f 1 OGII-law. ~ criminal justice system is built on the notion that 
it is hard for the government to convict, and the central 
purpose of the whole complicated system is that it is better 
that a few guilty go free than that one innocent man be 
wrongly convicted. It may be the balance swings too far in 
one direction or the other, but the underlying assumption 
seems to me to be unassailable. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart's takes the 
tact that the lineup-counsel requirement only comes into 
~Y after indictment. The formal charge marks, so the 
dissent argues, the momemt when the "criminal investigation 
has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced." This, 
in any practical sense, simply is not so. In many cases 
the police have focused attention on one prime target and 
have made the decision that this is the man whom they will 
seek to indict--it is no longer the broad-based investigation 
into an unsolved crime. Again, it seems to me that Miranda 





to find some mechanical point in the process to invoke the 
constitutional right to counsel. Justice Stewart also 
makes the argument that the state is more likely to have 
already provided an indicted man with an attorney, i.e. a 
post-indictment rule would be administratively easier to 
operate. Finally, he indicates that in pre-indictment 
cases, there is the rule of Stovall v. Denno applying the due 
process to void any lineups which are shown to be unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive of irreparable misidentification. 
This, it would seem, begs the question. One of the reasons 
for having counsel after an indictment is to guard against 
misidentification. The mere additional judicial argument 
does not explain why the line should be drawn at the indict-
ment stage. The dissent is unpersuasive. Even Justice White 
who wrote the dissents in Wade and Gilbert was unwilling to 
join Stewart's opinion here. Either the Court must go all 
the way and repudiate these cases or it must find some more 
logical cutoff point for the right to counsel (the point which 
I find most logical is the exigent circumstances test discussed 
briefly above). 
(2) Question # 2 
Assuming that the Court is unable to draw a line at 
the indictment stage, then it may wish to consider reversing 
its prior de<i!t.sions. This course is urged on the Court by 
both the Respondent, State of Illinois, and the amicus from 
California. That step would obviously be a giant one for 
the Court and will be trumpeted throughout the country as 





of the first indicia of the impact of the Nixon appointments 
on Warren Court precedents. Therefore, the decision will 
necessarily be one that will be long and carefully considered 
by any Justices voting to overrule Wade-Gilbert. At this 
point in time, it would probably not be terribly helpful 
to write either a defense or an attack on the lineup-counsel 
rule. Rather, it may be beneficial to look briefly at the 
underpinnings of Wade to determine what basis might be avail-
able for justifying rejection of that ruling less than 5 
~ears after it was announced. 
The notion that an accused is entitled to counsel at a 
lineup is apparently premised on two considerations. First, 
the presence of the accused's lawyer is likely to assure to 
ment 
a greater degree that the lineup will be conducted in an envirron~ 
relatively free of suggestive circumstances. The potential 
for the police to "tip-off" the witnes~Jgich person in the 
A 
lineup is the desired choice will be minimized. Indeed, it 
may have been contemplated that an attorney might make 
suggestions to assure a fair lineup in a spirit of cooperation 
with the police. Second, an attorney who was present at the 
confrontation will be better able to cross ... examine the 
identifying i itness at trial as to the circumstances of his 
out-of-court identification. One of the problems which 
existed before Wade, much like the problem before Miranda, 
was that there was never any reliable manner for determining 
what actually occurred at the police-accused confrontation. 
Too frequently the courts were presented with two stories which 
differed dramatically in their account of a particular confron-




often chose to believe the testimony of the police, who generally 
had less reason to lie and a better track record for reliabil-
ity than the ordinary defendant. While introducing an attorney 
into the confrontation might not have completely put to 
rest the "lieing match" aspects of many pretrial meetings, 
it probably did narrow the limits of fabrication on each 
side. The police are less likely to lie when they know that on 
cross-examination they may not be able to withstand a 
searching inquiry. Likewise, the defendant's attorney is 
likely to be much less willing to embellish the facts of the 
pretrial confrontat~ion than is an accused who might feel 
""' 
that he has nothing to lose. 
Neither of the briefs (California or Illinois) persuades 
me that the Court was in error in finding these interests 
sufficient to justify a holding calling for expansion of the 
right to counsel. The primary attack of both briefs is 
centered on the argument that counsel is ineffective at the 
lineup. He has no mandatory power to tell the police how the 
lineups are to be run. He cannot advise his client to refuse 
to stand for the lineup. Furthermore, it is even suggested that 
the nature of the adversary process is such that an attorney 
will strive for a suggestive lineup in order {o provide a 
basis for reversal at a later point. 
Several points should be made in rebuttal to these 
assertions. First, while the attorney has no power to compel 
a nonsuggestive lineup, his mere presence is likely to 
assure a more acceptable attempt on the part of the police. 
Even if he does not say a word in his client's behalf, his 




in which the array is presented and on the extent to which 
the officers make suggestive comments. 
It is, secondly, unfortunate that the Court does not 
have the opportunity to perform some empirical experiments 
of its own. Or, at the least, to view a representative sample 
of lineups. Last year many of the CADC law clerks were per~ 
mitted to attend local lineups to see how they progress. On 
one occasion Judge Wilkey went along to gain some firsthand 
experience himself. My impressron was that the police and 
the attorneys present (mostly court-appointed) cooperated 
cordially in preparing the array for the identification. 
The attorney could tell his client where to stand, could in-
struct him to walk and talk normally, could suggest that 
one or another person be added to or deleted from the array, 
could suggest that his client either take off are put on an 
article of clothing to assure that he did not stick out 
because of his clothes, etc. There appeared to be none of 
the expected adversariness about the procedure; the two 
sides seemed able to work fluidly together. The attorney 
was routinely provided with the description of his client 
given by the witness to the police. Also, a photo of the 
array was routinely taken and preserved by the Government to 
introduce at trial to show that the lineup was free of 
suggestivity. This entire procedure has, in the District, been 
codified into police regulations drafted by the Department 8 s 
Legal Counsel Office. With the procedure this highly developed 
it is not surprising that attorneys no longer find it of as 
great value to be present at the confrontation as they might 
I 
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The argument has also been made that the attorney's 
presense is not valuable because the attorney may not 
take the stand to testify about the circumstances of the 
lineup. But, as I view the utility of cross-examinationp he 
need not testify. Rather he asks the witness to describe the 
circumstances of the identification and has a basis to impeach 
if the witness deviates from the facts as he knows them. 
The briefs in this case suffer somewhat because Petr has 
not undertaken to defend in any detail the Wade principle. 
We have not been cited to any law review or other authorities 
which defend the side of the coin opposite to the tact taken 
by the two states arguning in this case. Before any serious 
' 
decision to reverse Wade ~ undertaken--at least on the basis 
of the practical considerations proffered by Respondent and 
amicus--a thorough search of the authorities sh~uld be 
undertaken. 
One final point, this particular case would seem to be a 
poor one in which to repudiate Wade and Gilbert. The facts 
in the case are not very sympathetic to the govermment. 
This was the sort of one-on-one showup which is likely 
to lead to misidentification. The Illinois Supreme Court 
held that in light of the totality of the circumstances 
the showup was not impermissibly suggestive. That question 
is not now, strictly speaking, before the Court since the 
grant of cert was limited to the pre-indictment counsel quest-
··?~ Vle.VII of 
ion. Nevertheless, the fact that the lineup did not comport 
A 
with what the Court could refer to as good police practice, 
this might be a poor case in which to announce that the 




of practical utility. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the importance of the problem, and because 
the Petr does not persuasively defend the Wade rule, I have 
written more than I intended to write. While I have indicated 
a clear position on this case, I do not know tha~ were I writing 
this memo 5 years ago before Wade was decided;~ I would have 
made the same recommendation. But, that point has been passed 
and the burden has shifted to those who wish to wipe away 
what the Court has already done. On the question whether 
Wade may be restricted in its applability to post-indict-
ment lineups, I think that the burden has clearly not been 
met. Justice Stewart's attempt does not succeed. On the 
w~~lt. 
more fundam~tal question whether 5R4 a~ should be thrown 
out, the evidence gathered to date is not compell~ enough 
to justify repudiation of Wade on the ground that the 
Court efred as a matter of empirical knowledge. That 
leaves the Court only with the choice of stating that the 
change in the judicial philosophy of new members on the Court 
C:..~;o.+ 
since 1967 (5 of those on the Wade~are gone, replaced by 
Justice Marshall and the 4 Nixon appointees). That is a step 
which I doubt the Court is prepared to take at this early 
date. 
I wouldo therefore, reverse in a short opinion, indi-
t-h~fl 
eating wh~le Wade-Gilbert, like all other precedents,will 
A 
continue to be the subject of close scrutiny, so long as it 
survives no distinction may be drawn between the pre and post• 
indictment lineup~ . Conceivably, in dicta, the Court might 
lay down a dividing line, as the Brennan opinion appears to do 
.. 





in his draft (arrest, abs~t exigent circumstsnces). 
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lfp/ss lee 3/21/72 
Larry. 
KIRBY v. ILLINOIS No. 70-5061 
Argued 3/21/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
See the notes of my views on the bench memo, prepared by 
Tentative Views: 
1. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 and Gilbert, 388 U. S. 263 establish 
"a per se exclusionary rule" as to testimony with respect to identifica-
tion at a line-up where the suspect does not have counsel. The 
majority opinions give two reasons: (i) that such a rule is necessary 
as a sanction for law enforcement; and (ii) that it promotes fairness 
in criminal trials. On the first point, in Gilbert the Court said: 
"Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony 
can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforce-
ment authorities will respect the ooc:used's constitutuional 
right to the presence of his counsel at the critical 
line-up. " 388 U. S. 273 
If I had been on the Court, I would have joined with Justices White, 
stewart and Harlan in dissenting. 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the princi:r:>al briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
.. ' 
2. 
2. Wade and Gilbert involved post-indictment line-ups. This 
case (Kirby) involved a pre-indictment "show-up". In the two earlier 
cases it was held that a "line-up" is a "critical stage" in a criminal 
prosecution, requiring counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 
I suppose we could hold - as Justice stewart's tentative draft 
opinion does - that there is a valid distinction between a post-indictment -
and a pre-indictment identification. Although I may be willing to accept 
this view, I doubt that such a distinction is necessarily sound. 
It is true that an indictment usually follows a preliminary hearing, 
and the Court has held that counsel is required at such a hearing. Thus, 
an accused person would then have counsel representing him. Moreover 
the stage is somewhat more "critical" than the pre-indictment "show-up". 
The 1~ can be quite preliminary, and can benefit the innocent who 
might otherwise be detained. 
But facts and circumstances vary quite widely, and - for reasons 
stated by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in Wade - I am not sure that 
a distinction is justified on principle . 
.,,,L<l(,~ ~ C.tC.~ 
3. I am ef'f'8tHui to "per se exclusioary rules" for the purpose 
of disiciplining police officers unless the Constitution clearly mandates 
them. The Constitution does require the right to counsel, but only 
"in criminal prosecutions". I do not think it can be said that every 
3. 
identification of a suspect, or even of a person indicted, is a part of 
"a criminal prosecution". 
We have already encrusted the criminal trial with a number of 
"per se exclusionary rules". No other country has imposed such a 
straight-jacket on its criminal system and on law enforcement. 
4. It is far wiser, if one takes the long view, to apply the 
stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 concept that an identification always 
can be excluded if it was unduly suggestive or otherwise violated 
fundamental fairness. In stovall, the Court refused to make Wade and 
Gilbert retroactive for several reasons. One of these was because -
in the Wade-Gilbert type of situation: 
"It remains open to all persons to allege and prov~ 
as stovall att empts to do in this case , that the 
confrontation resulted in such unfairness that it 
infringed his right to due process of law. See 
Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199 (CA 4 1966)." 
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No. 70-5061 OT 1971 Kirby v. Illinois 
Judge: 
Attached you will finds (1) the 3d draft of Justice 
Brennan's dissent in this prewaccusation lineup vase; and 
(2) Just •1ce White's separate statement dissenting because of 
the binding influence of Wade and Gilbert. 
Justice Brennan's dissent is changed only in that he 
has examined the briefs in three cases dealing with the 
Wade-Gilbert problem--Foster, Coleman, and Stovall--and 
has demonstrated that the Court entirely ignored the rationale 








Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-5061 
PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE THEORY 
My note yesterday failed to make clear the thesis I am 
suggesting. I will, therefore, restate it here. 
Wade-Gilbert, like all rules extending the right to 
counsel to new areas, was written in the face of serious 
practical problems. Whenever the procedural protections 
accorded the accused are expanded they, necessarily, make the 
prosecutor's task more difficult. Sometimes the problem is 
simply a financial one for the states--breathing more lawyers 
into the system. In other cases, however, the primary diffi-
culty of a new right to counsel rule might be its impact on 
th~ fluid administration of justice. This is such a case. 
The interests in this case--itemized in Justice White's 
Wade dissent--inhere in the efficient investigation of un-
solved crime. Immediately upon apprehending a suspect it 
is in the interest of the police to obtain a positive or 
negative investigation. If the police can hold a lineup 
immediately they may determine whether they have the right 
man or the wrong man. If they have the wrong man it will 
signal the police that their investigation must continue. 
Moreover, there is a substantial interest in promptitude 
because, as any investigator knows, the memories of victims 
and witnesses fades radidly after a crime. If the police are 
forced to hold the suspect until such time as counsel can be 
appointed and a convenient time arranged for a showing (re-
member that the witnesses, the accused 9 the prosecutorp and 
his attorney must all meet at the same time--conceivably 
this might entail a delay of several days). Additionally, 
it is in the best interests of the accused--if he is innocent--
,-
. " . 
. 
' 




to have a quick showing in ~der that he can be released, 
rather than lanquishing in jail awaiting an identification. 
How did Wade address these practical problems with a 
rule that counsel is required at every lineup? By indirection, 
it dodged the tough questions. It focused on the problem 
as if the accused already had counsel and it was simply a 
matter of giving him a call. Or, if t~ime did not permit 
contacting the accused's attorney, substitute counsel might 
be permissible. This answer clearly assumes that counsel has 
already been appointed. In fact, the majority specifically 
nated that both Wade and Gilbert already had counsel appointed 
to represent them. With this response of the majorityvs in 
mind, and emphasizing that the Court was clearly presented 
with both a request to extend the counsel right to every 
lineup and a lising of the prtiactical impediments, the several 
statements that the cases held lineups essential for "post-
indictment showings takes on added significance. 
You are on record, in Argersinger, as doubting the efficacy 
at the lineup stage 
of prophylactic rules. Because counsel/may be necessary to 
assure a fair trial in some cases, the Court in Wade mandated 
that counsel be present in every post-indictment case. To 
enforce the prophylactic rule the Court imposed a per se 
exclusionary rule which operates to render inadmissible 
post-indictment 
every/pretrial lineup in which counsel was not provided, 
irrespective how professionally the lineup was conducted. 
You may wonder whether either the rigid prophylaxis or the 
per se exclusionary rule are justified under the fundamental 
fairness test of due process. And, if this case squarely 






' . . 
' 
--3--
join the dissenters in that case. But this case, does not 
require re-examination of the basic premise since it raises 
a question which is beyond the scope of Wade. The most 
fundamental of restraintist notions compel that Justices not 
reach out to overrule conSDtitutional decisions where to so 
so is not necessary to an appropriate disposition of the case 
before the Court. 
The Court has been shown no reason to do today what it 
refused to do in 1967 when Wade was written. The practical 
barriers to the total extension of the prophylactic & ex-
clusionary rules are as formidable today as they were then. 
You could register your vote to affirm on the basis that you 
are content to leave matters where you understand them to 
have been left in Wade. The critical line which was drawn 
in Wade is whether or not the investigation has sufficiently 
progressed to the point at which counsel has already been 
appointed. Usually this is the indictment stage. But, often, 
as Justuce Stewart J.llX)tes , formal accusa·tion and appointment 
of counsel precede indictment and you can agree with Justice 
Stewart that Wade was written to apply at that stage since, like 
after an indictment , counsel is available. 
You might close by reminding the dissenters that you 
approve of the rationale of Stovall that the due process 
clause renders inadmissible any identification which takes 
place under circumstances which lead to the possibility of an 
irreparably mistaken identification. This rule operates 
whether or not the accused has counsel at the showing , and 
it stands to assure that the rights of the accused will not 
go begging . 





. ) .. 
--4--
NOTE: This is not the approach followed by Justice Stewart. 
His effort is to distinguish Wade in terms of the language 
of the opinion and the constitutional principles on which the 
case is based. That effort totally fails as Justice Brennan 
illustrates. 
One of the arguments which will be made is that drrawing 
a line at the formal accusation stage will permit easy 
subversion. Police will simply embark upon the practice of 
holding all lineups before counsel is appointed. There are 
at least two answers to this assertion. First, it presupposes 
a level of disingenuousness on the part of federal and state 
prosecurorial officials which is not warranted by anything 
other than bald assertion. Second, we know that some juris~ 
dictions, notably the District of Columbia, have established 
an enviable set of police regulations governing lineups. 
Those regulations are written and available and can be cited 
as a model of regularized procedure. Lineups are held in 
virtually every case and the lineup occurs very shortly after 
arraignment and appointment of counsel. Counsel and prosecutor 
cooperate to place the accused in a lineup which will not 
allow him to stand out. There is no real likelihood that the 
DC police are going to throw out their well established and 
fluid procedure. 
I urge you to consider a short opinion along these lines. 
LAH 






(1) Focus on following language in Wade: 
"No substantial countervail ing policy considerations 
have been advanced against the requirement of presence 
of counsel. Concern is expressed that the requirement 
will forestall prompt identifications and result in 
obstruction of the confrontations . As for the first , 
we note that in the two cases in which the right to 
counsel is today held to applyp counsel has already 
been appointed and no argument is made in either case 
that notice to counsel would have prejudicially delayed 
the confrontations. Moreover, we leave open the question 
whether the presence of substitute counsel might not suffice 
where notification and presence of the suspectis own -counsel would result in prejudicial delay. 
A footnote appended to the above discussion repeats the salient 
point: 
"Although the right to counsel usually means a right to 
the suspect ' s own counsel , provision for substitute 
counsel may be justified on the ground that the 
subst i tute counsel 9 s presence may eliminate the hazards 
which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence 
of the suspect ' s own counsel," 
(2) Justice White ' s dissent may have been the force causing 
the majority to note the practical aspects of their opinion . 
He speaks of the state's "valid interests" in the "prompt 
and efficient enforcement of its criminal laws." 
"Identifications frequently take place after the arrest but 
before an indictment is returned or an information is 
filed. The police may have arrested a suspect on pro-
bable cause but may still have the wrong man. Both the 
suspect and the State have every interest in the prompt 
and early identification at that stage . , , . Unavoid-
ably , however , the absolute rule requiring the presence 
of counsel will cause significant delay and it may 
very well result in no pretrial identification at all. 
--2--
"Counsel must be appointed and a time arranged convenient 
for him and the witness .. II . . 
(3) A look at the briefs in Wade--especially the SG's brief--
it is by bet will indicate that one of tl~ arguments raised 
was that there were significant practical problems with 
counsel at lineups. And, it is also my bet, that they will 
indicate that the gravest practical problems arise where the 
~accused has not yet been r.;• lliL • counsel. 
~ 
(4) The majority's indirect to the arguments of the SG and 
A 
the dissenters was simply to limit the decision to post-in-
dictment confrontations, since the accused will already have 
been appointed counsel. That is certainly the import of the 
language quoted in (1) above referring to the fact that he 
already has counsel. 
(5) Viewed in this light, the holding requested in Kirby 
is an extension that the Court was unwilling to make at 
that time. You may agree with the dissenters in this case 
that a good lawyer would read the Wade thesis as equally 
applicable to all lineups, whether pre or post-indictment. 
While you have reservations about the Court's power to 
write exclusionary rules to effectuate Constitutional 
decisions, you need not take issue with Wade in this case 
because--at least in terms of the practical application of 
the Wade rule--Kirby marks an extension. 
(6) If this case is a test of "principled constitutional 
adjudication" it might be well to point out that any lack of 
principle is attributable directly to Wade iteelf. It is 
strange that the dissenters can now accuse the majority of 
being unprincipled because they refuse to do what the majority 
in Wade itself refused to do. 
--3- .. 
(7) While you are unwilling to extend Wade , you may note that 
the constitutional protection at which Wade was primarily aimed .. -
protection against suggestive showings which might lead to 
irreparable misidentification~-is still protected under the 
due process clause. That clause is breferable at any rate 
since it requires no per se rules but asks only a case-by-case 
application. 
I think a separate concurrence along these lines would have 
h b f . f h I h h d" J.- f . 1 t e ene ·1t o onesty . t as t e 1s~vantage o tac1t y 
recognizing that the line drawn (indictment) is not one de-
rived from the Constitution itself . If this view commends 
itself ·to youp I can write a two or three page opinion in a 
matter of hours . If this view does not commend itself to 
you , I recommend that you simply concur in the result without 
stating anything at all . 
LAH 
CHAMBERS OF" 
b,:,rSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~nprtmt Qftturl ttf tqt ~tb ~tnf.tg 
._-aslpnghm, ~. <q. 2llgt'!~ ' 
May 2, 1972 
Re: 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court in this 
case. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 











~u.prttttt <!Iourt of tqt 'J!tttittb ~httt.tl 
Jl"Mfril41tttn, }B. <!f. 2061'1~ 
CHAMBERS Of" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. May 2, 1972 
RE: No. 70-5061 -Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Potter : 
In due course I shall circulate a 
dissent in the above. 
Mr. Just ice Stewart 
cc:The Conference .r·· 







~tmt <!fmtri of tqt ~ttiftb ,ifattg 
~zudrmgtMt~ ~. <!f. 2llbl~.;l ' 
STICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
J/u.!-5. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 














.:§u.punu <!Jonrt of tire ~1titt~ .;%;tatet> 
~l!rat>lp:ng±on. ~. ~· 211giJ1$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS May 8, 1972 
Dear Bill: 
In No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. 
Illinois, please join me in your 
dissent. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 









TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: May 8, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois 
In accord with our discussion, I would appreciate your drafting 
a very brief cmeurring opinion along the lines of my "tentative views". 
If we had more time, I would like to elaborate a good deal on 
these - wlick, in essence, are in accord with your "exigent circum-
stances" view. 
But it seems to me that already we are behind with our opinions 
(with 5 court opinions still not yet drafted, plus concurrences and 
dissents), and accordingly I am thinking in Kir)Jy primarily of keeping 
my options open for the future. I will do this by refraining from joining 
rule 
in a new 'f>er se't Unfortunately, as I view it, the Court over the years 
has converted our Constitution from a great document of principle into 
an infiexible criminal code. This was never intended, and is contrary 
to the basic concept of an enduring constitution. 























May 8, 1972 
Re: ~o. 70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Potter: 
" I will cmcur with the affirmance 1n your opinion, but may 
express separately - if I can arttculate them - the views I stated 
at the Conference. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. JUstice Stewart 










Re; Kirby v. Illinois, 70-5061 
Judge: 
Attached you will find Justice Stewart's proposed op~ 
inion for the Ct in Kirby, involving the question whether the 
Wade counsel requirement applies to pre-indictment lineups. 
This draft, although somewhat longer than his former dissent 
for the 7-man Ct, is largely unchanged. He does make one 
p 
noteworthy modification. Rather tha~rawing the line at 
;J 
the indictment, he now draws the line
1 
"initiation of adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by way of formal 
charge, pre]iminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment. " G I' 7) 
I am attaching, from the file on this case, my bench memo 
ahd your "Tentative views." As my memo reflects, I think 
that Justice Stewartvs view is clearly unacceptable. (See 
pp. 2-9 of my bench memo.) Rather than restating the reasons 
for my disagreement, I will refer you to the remarks in my 
memo. Your tentative notes, as I read them, indicate that 
your vote is bottomed on a disagreement with the per se excl-
usionary rule of Wade-Gilbert. As I said in my memo, that 
may be a reason to vote to overrule Wade but it does not serve 
as a solid basis for distinguishing Wade here. Is there really 
any serious doubt that the showup in this case was any less a 
critical stage than the lineup in Wade? Is the defendant's 
interest in assuring a fair showing or in preserving the 
facts of the showing for cross"examination at trial at all 
diminished? 
Your views suggest an alternative, which to me, seems 
much more sensible. It is true that there are a wide range 







Some occur shortly after the commission of the crime when 
a suspect is picked up near the scene of the crime and is 
returned to be viewed by the victim. In such a case the 
delay involved in obtaining an attorney for the accused 
a 
suspect might well cause /hurtful lag in the investigation. 
If the wrong man has been apprehended, the police need to 
know that fact so that the investigation may be resumed. 
Moreover, the witness's memory is likely to be freshest 
immediately after the crime. There might be other circum-
stances as well in which one or both of two considerations 
occurs (1) some exigent circumstance makes an immediate 
lineup essential t~he criminal investigation without the 
delay attendant upon appointing an attorney to assist with a 
I' ,.,/ 1 ,_ e.- J, end? .. 
formal lineup; or (2) in a rare case conceivably tqe eas~ h~ 
~ ~VYIJ 
not focused upon any one suspect but ..J..s stil~-9' broadbased 
investigation (for instance, a case might arise in which a 
woman is mugged on the grounds of a state hospital and the 
police take her to a room in the hospital and allow her to 
see all of the patients who were conceivably in the area at 
the time of the crime--in this case it would be silly to 
require counsel for each inmate). I would urge you to think 
seriously about adopting an "exigent circumstances" rule 
rather than any rigid artificial rule. 
I think Justice White has the soundest view in this case. 
While he has no love for Wade & Gilbert, he recognizes that 
unless they are to be overruled they control the instant case. 
LAH 
5/9/72- .. LAH 
Res Kirby v. Illinois, No . 70-5061 
Judges 
Attached is the first draft of Justice Brennan's dis~t 
,.. 
in this pre--indictment lineup case. Effectively, I think, it 
"' 
obliterates Justice Stewart's efforts to distinguish WadeeGil-
bert. I can add nothing to his discussion on the discussion 
of these precedents. Any intelligent lawyer reading Wade and 
Gilbert and the other cases cited by Justice Brennan (Stovall 
and Foster) I think would come to the conclusion that there 
is no rational basis for drawing a line of constitutional 
significance at the artificial stage of "formal accusation." 
I would like to reiterate that Wade is written in such 
a fashion that it has little practical effect in terms of 
the thing that seems to concern you--per se exclusion. If 
the petitioner was without counsel , the witness's testimony 
about the pretrial confrontation is per se excluded. Butp if 
an "independent source" can be found--as it almost always 
can where the victim had any reasonable opportunity to view 
the criminal during the crime-@the witness may then still be 
permitted to make an in-court identification. Moreover , even 
if a counselless lineup is introduced at trial , or even if 
the TC erred in finding an independent source , the harmless 
error doctrine still prevents reversal if , loosel~ speakingp 
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. With those safety 
valves built into the system , I would think that the clearly 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j;u:puuu <!f~nrt ~f tlrt ~ttittb ~tattg 
~aglrmgt~n. !9. <!f. zog;Jl.~ 
May 18, 1972 
No. 70-5061 -- Kirby v. illinois 
Dear Potter: 
as follows: 
Please amend my concurring statement to read 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring. 
I agree that the right to counsel attaches as 
soon as criminal charges are formally made 
against an accused and he becomes the sub-
ject of a 11 criminal prosecution.'' Therefore 
I join in the Court's opinion and holding. 
Cf. Colemanv. Alabama, 399U.S. 1, 21 
(dissenting opinion). 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
_ , 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§ttpt"tntt C!fond of tltt 'Jlittitt~ $5tl:ti{a-
'ma:a-Iyingto-n.'l3. C!f. 2ll6iJL-;1 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL May 18 1 1972 
Re: No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 












5/24/72- ... LAH 
Rea Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70 8 5061 
Judge: 
Attached is another draft of Justice Brennan's dissent 
in this case. The only addition is a footnote, beginning 
on page 14, which states that only 5 out of at least 18 
states which have passed on this question have found a 
distinction between pre- and post-indictment lineups. It 
also points out that every federal CA has held that the 
Wade-Gilbert rule applies in the pre-indictment area. Fi~ 
nally, it cites the most recent opinion from the CAlO in 







Rea Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-5061 OT 1971 
Judge• 
Attached is the most recent draft of Justice Stewartgs 
opinion in Kirby. It adds your statement at the end of the 
opinion (p. 9). Upon seeing your notation on Friday, Mr. 
Putzel called and asked for clarification. He suggested, 
and I agree, that you change the words 11 I concur in the 
holding of the Court," to the followings "I concur in the 
result reached by the Court." Mr. Putzel says that words to 
the latter effect more clearly state jjjjj that the author 
does not join in the content of the plurality opinion. 
In order to effect this change, if you agree with mr. 
Putzel's suggestion, you should write a memo to Justd..ce 
Stewart asking him to change your statement. Since the 
opinion may well come down this week, you should act on this 
forthwith. 
f\}ole: 1'1 "'7011 ~~ ~ 




..§uprtmt <qllltrl of t4r 'J!Urif.eb' ..§taftg 
~a:sfringtcn, ;!8. <q. 20biJ1·.;l 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois 
Dear Potter: 
The Reporter has suggested the following technical revision 
of my concurrence: 
"As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se 
exclusionary rule, I concur in the result reached 
by the Court. " 
Please make this change, if this meets with your approval. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
I •. 
. ., 









. -.·.~ . 
... , 
i ,,. 
June 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Wtnois 
Dear Potter: 
The Reporter has suggested the following technical revision 
of my concurrence: 
"As I would not extend the Wade-Ollbert ~ se 
exclusionary rule, I coocur in the result reacned 
by the Court. " 
Please make this change, if this meets with your approval. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice stewart 
cc: The Conference 
. . 
'·· 
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THE C. J. W. 0. D. W. J. B. P. S. B. R. W. T. l\1. H. A. B. L. F. P. W.H.R. 
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